Attitude-Dependent Altruism, Turnout and Voting by Julio J. Rotemberg
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES








This paper was first written at the Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences and I am grateful
for the Center's hospitality and support. I also wish to thank Alan Gerber, Virginia Kwan, Sam Popkin
and Garth Saloner for valuable discussions.  Seminar participants at Princeton and Yale provided helpful
comments. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2008 by Julio J. Rotemberg. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.Attitude-Dependent Altruism, Turnout and Voting
Julio J. Rotemberg




This paper presents a goal-oriented model of political participation based on two psychological assumptions.
The first is that people are more altruistic towards individuals that agree with them and the second
is that people's well-being rises when other people share their personal opinions. The act of voting
is then a source of vicarious utility because it raises the well-being of individuals that agree with the
voter. Substantial equilibrium turnout emerges with nontrivial voting costs and modest altruism. The
model can explain higher turnout in close elections as well as votes for third-party candidates with
no prospect of victory. For certain parameters, these third party candidates lose votes to more popular
candidates, a phenomenon often called strategic voting. For other parameters, the model predicts "vote-stealing"
where the addition of a third candidate robs a viable major candidate of electoral support.
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This paper presents a simple model of turnout and voting based on two features of human
psychology. The ¯rst is people's tendency to be more altruistic towards those who agree with
them. The second is the gain in self-esteem and well-being that people tend to experience
when they ¯nd out that others share their opinions. This second feature implies that each
vote for a candidate (or a proposition) raises the welfare of people who think highly of this
candidate (or proposition), since this vote validates their opinion. Voting for a candidate
thus gives people an opportunity to enhance the welfare of those they agree with.
The e®ect of voting that is stressed here is that it changes people's perception of how
many individuals have a particular view. Every vote contains some information about this
because people are uncertain regarding the views of abstainers. If I expect an abstainer to
agree with me with probability ~ p, one less abstention coupled with one more vote for the
candidate I favor raises my estimate of the expected number of people that agree with me by
(1¡~ p). This cannot be expected to have a very substantial e®ect on any one person's utility.
The importance of this phenomenon lies in the fact that the number of people changing
their perception is as large as the electorate. Thus, even if a single vote has only a very
slight e®ect on the utility of any one other person, and even if each person's altruism for
individuals that agree with them is small, the capacity to give a tiny bit of pleasure to a
large population can be su±cient to induce people to incur realistic costs of voting.
This sets the model apart from pivotal voter models based on Downs (1957) and Riker
and Ordeshook (1968). As has been extensively discussed, these models cannot explain why
so many people vote. Once votes are numerous, the probability that one vote will tip the
election is negligible. It is even less appealing to imagine that people vote for third-party
candidates to ensure their victory since there is often complete consensus that they have no
chance of winning.
This lack of electoral viability does not stop such candidates from obtaining votes, even
in close contests. An extreme set of examples of this phenomenon was observed in the 2000
1U.S. Presidential election in Florida. In this election, each of 8 candidates representing the
Green, Reform, Libertarian, Workers World, Constitution, Socialist and Socialist Workers
Parties obtained more votes than the 537 votes that separated the victor George Bush from
his runner-up Al Gore. While the least popular of these obtained 562 votes, the Green Party
candidate Ralph Nader obtained over 97,000 votes and was accused by Democrats of having
cost Al Gore the U.S. presidency.1
People who vote for third party candidates can be divided in two: those that would have
abstained if no minor candidate were running and those that would have voted for a major
party candidate instead. Lacy and Burden (1999) call the latter a \vote stealing" e®ect of
third party candidates while they call the former a \turnout" e®ect of their presence. They
¯nd that Ross Perot's 1992 Presidential candidacy had both e®ects. The turnout e®ect may
be less problematic for conventional theories of voting because the resulting votes for third
party candidates do not a®ect the election's outcome. The vote stealing e®ect, by contrast,
can lead a viable major party candidate to lose the election as a result of the entry of an
unviable one.
Thus e®ect seems particularly challenging for pivotal voter theories. If the people who
sympathize with a major candidate vote for a minor one, they are essentially helping the
major candidate they like the least. The only existing academic explanation for these small-
party votes appears to be the Brennan and Buchanan (1984) idea that people derive utility
from expressing an attitude by voting. The model presented here is related to this \expressive
voting" idea in the sense that, unlike what is true in pivotal voter models, the purpose of
voting is not primarily to a®ect the election's outcome.
An observation regarding third party candidates that is more consistent with conventional
theories of voting is that people who prefer minor candidates sometimes vote for major party
candidates that have a chance of electoral success (Cain 1978, Abramson et al 1992). This
phenomenon has been dubbed \strategic voting" (see Cox 1997) and has been taken to be
1Added to Gore's victory in other states, a Gore victory in Florida would have led him to become
U.S. president. For evidence that many Democrats were angry at Nader, see \A Fading 'Nader Factor' ",
Washington Post, October 22, 2004.
2supportive of the idea that people vote to a®ect the election's outcome. This paper provides
a rather di®erent interpretation. This is that voting for major party candidates has the
bene¯t that more people derive utility from learning that people agree with them. One
advantage of this interpretation is that \strategic voting" and \vote stealing," which seem
contradictory in conventional accounts, can be ¯t into the same framework. Which outcome
prevails then depends only on the taste parameters characterizing the people who like third
party candidates.
A di®erent observation that has played a central role in the literature is that turnout
is larger in closer elections (Blais 2000). This has been taken to be supportive of pivotal
voter models on the ground that some leading alternatives do not share this prediction. In
particular, theories of expressive voting where people derive direct utility from expressing
a point of view through their vote do not predict any association between turnout and the
margin of victory.2 The same is true if people vote only out of a sense of duty. Similarly,
several observers have noted that Ferejohn and Fiorina's (1974) theory of voting, according
to which people vote to avoid the regret of failing to vote for a candidate that loses, does
not predict the observed relation between turnout and victory margin across elections.
The current model does imply that turnout should fall when elections are more lopsided
although, consistent with the evidence, this e®ect is predicted to be quite modest. The
reason why election closeness matters is that the altruistic bene¯ts of voting are reduced in
more lopsided elections. If a candidate can expect the support of the vast majority of the
population, his supporters do not derive as much utility from an additional vote because they
already expect abstainers to agree with them. At the other extreme, the vicarious bene¯ts
of voting for a candidate are lessened as the number of his supporters fall.
One reason third-party candidates continue to get votes is that this latter e®ect is o®set
by the fact that each vote for a third party candidate is more valuable to its supporters for
2Schuessler (2000) assumes that people vote to attach themselves to a group and further supposes that
the bene¯ts people obtain from this attachment depend on the group's size. This model of expressive voting
should thus imply a connection between turnout and voting outcomes. These implications are likely to
depend heavily on the properties one assumes about the bene¯ts of attachment, however.
3being more unexpected. In addition, supporters of minor candidates may ¯nd it particularly
valuable to hear that others agree with them. This ¯ts with the reason given by the Lib-
ertarian presidential candidate in 2000, Harry Browne, for his interest in obtaining votes.
\Like other Libertarians, I was disappointed with the vote total we received. I had hoped
we would achieve two electoral breakthroughs: 1. Surpass a million votes for the ¯rst time.
2. Outpoll Pat Buchanan and the Reform Party. Neither achievement would have created a
turning point in American politics. But either one would have been a boost to Libertarian
morale..."3
This paper is not the ¯rst to use non-sel¯sh preferences as a rationale for voting. Jankowski
(2002) and Fowler (2006) consider altruistic individuals who vote because they internalize
other people's bene¯t from the election of a particular candidate. The current model shares
these models' prediction that altruists with strong political opinions are more likely to vote
(for which Fowler (2006) provides empirical support). My model di®ers in that I suppose
that people also derive utility from discovering that others agree with them. This is what
makes the probability of being pivotal less important in my model.
Other related papers suggest that people might be willing to vote to help the interest
group that they belong to. In Uhlaner (1989) group members vote for the candidates cho-
sen by their leaders, with leaders obtaining promises from candidates in exchange for their
group's support. Whether these promises involve resources or changes in the candidate's
electoral platform, their value hinges on the candidate winning the election. Her model is
thus able to explain why major candidates can count with the votes of di®erent groups.
However, Uhlaner (1989) cannot explain why candidates with no prospect of winning an
election stand for o±ce rather than taking advantage of their support to win concessions from
more viable candidates. Situations where the entry of third-party candidates rob a leading
candidates of votes and cost the candidate the election seem particularly inconsistent with
her model. In the current model, this outcome is possible because group leaders are unable
to redirect votes and negotiate with leading candidates. The Feddersen and Sandroni (2006)
3This report can be found in http://www.harrybrowne.org/2000/toc.htm.
4model shares with Uhlaner (1989) that it can be interpreted as one where leaders can induce
turnout to win elections, though it also has an interpretation where groups of voters vote
if they feel that doing so is directly bene¯cial to their group. However, the only bene¯ts in
this model are the bene¯ts that accrue with electoral victory, so this model cannot explain
votes for third-party candidates either.
The current paper rationalizes voting on the basis of two psychological assumptions for
which there is some evidence in the literature. Evidence for the idea that people are more
helpful and have warmer feelings towards those that agree with them has been presented in
two kinds of studies. The ¯rst involves ¯eld and experimental data that people report more
\liking" for people that they agree with. Byrne (1961) obtains this result by manipulating
experimentally the extent to which a confederate agrees with a subject, and numerous vari-
ants of this study have been carried out since.4 Similarly, Brady and Sniderman (1985, p.
1067) show that people who describe themselves as liberals report warmer and more favor-
able feelings towards liberals than towards conservatives, while self-described conservatives
do the reverse.
Expressions of liking are easier to elicit in an experiment than altruism or helping be-
havior. The two are likely to be linked, however. The subjects in Kanekar and Merchant
(2001) expect more helping from people who like each other more. More directly, Karylowski
(1978) obtained more help in the laboratory from people who were led to believe that their
experimental partners were more similar to them.5
A second demonstration that people are more helpful to those they agree with is based
on the lost letter technique pioneered by Milgram et al (1965). For purposes of this paper,
Tucker et al. (1977) is particularly revealing. They left parcels with either a 2$ money order
or 2$ in cash on the sidewalk to be picked up by strangers. Attached to these funds were
contribution forms and a stamped and addressed envelope that made it clear that the funds
4See Montoya and Horton (2004) for a recent example.
5Similarity of interests, rather than similarity of attitudes, was used in this study. Still, the empirical
connection between liking and similarity found in the literature seems robust to varying the dimension of
similarity.
5were intended for a medical charity. In some of the experimental treatments, there was also
a form where the purported contributor had ¯lled out an opinion questionnaire that was
addressed to a polling organization. These packages were left in a predominantly Jewish
neighborhood and the stated opinions were either favorable to American aid to Israel or
opposed such aid. The paper reports that the cash and the money order were more likely
to be forwarded if the questionnaire contained pro-Israeli views, which is consistent with
the idea that people are more inclined to help strangers if they agree with them. Notice in
particular that people's desire to help the medical charity is not su±cient to explain this
¯nding, since this would not explain a di®erential rate of forwarding the funds.6
In a related study, Sole et al. (1975) used money orders for medical foundations that
were attached to questionnaires relating to other political issues (including discrimination
and the desirability of war). When the opinions expressed in these questionnaires matched
more closely the opinions that were obtained from people chosen randomly in the same
neighborhood, a larger fraction of the money orders was forwarded. This e®ect was stronger
when the opinions related to important issues such as discrimination than when they referred
to less important issues (such as whether groceries should be delivered for free).
The second psychological assumption of this paper is that people's well-being rises when
they ¯nd that others agree with them. This may be seen as intrinsically di±cult to establish
because well-being is unobservable. There is, however, some experimental evidence showing
that self-reported feelings are correlated with information that subjects are given about the
attitudes of other people. Kenworthy and Miller (2001) asked subjects whether they were for
or against the death penalty and then told them the responses to this question in a (bogus)
poll. After they were given this information, subjects were asked to report their feelings.
Respondents who were told their position was losing support reported feeling substantially
worse than those that were told that support for their position was growing. In a related
study, Pool et al. (1998) elicited attitudes towards an issue from students and then told
6By contrast, the fact that the questionnaire was also forwarded more frequently when it contained
pro-Israeli views could be attributable to pro-Israeli bias.
6subjects that a group that the students identi¯ed with held opposite views. This led to a
measurable drop in reported self-esteem.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the model's general structure
and derives its equilibrium conditions. Section 3 then turns its attention to electoral compe-
titions with two types of people, each of which supports a di®erent candidate for o±ce. Its
main result is that turnout is larger in closer elections. Section 4 considers electoral compe-
tition in which small groups of people prefer minor candidates to major ones. It shows that,
under plausible assumptions, third-party candidates with no prospect of winning can receive
votes that can cost a major candidate the election. It also shows that, for certain param-
eters, the model is consistent with the observation that some people stop voting for viable
major candidates when third-party candidates stand for o±ce. For other parameters, people
continue to vote for major candidates even though they prefer the position of third-party
candidates. Section 5 o®ers some concluding remarks.
2 Basic Setting
People's preferences depend on their type. As in spatial voting models, let the vector ri
denote the ideal position of individuals of type i and let dij be a measure of the subjective
distance between ri and rj with dii = 0. Candidates also belong to these types, although
there can be more types than candidates. Because I assume that there is at most one
candidate of each type, the candidate who prefers rk can be referred to as candidate k.
Let yix be the \material payo®s" of individual x of type i. This material payo® is assumed
to depend on three variables. First, as in Downs (1957), any individual of type i su®ers the
loss die when the elected candidate is of type e.7 Second, the individual incurs the cost c if
he votes, where this cost is a random variable drawn independently for each person from the
7In the Downs (1957) framework, this leads people to vote for the candidate k with the lowest value of dik.
There is an extensive empirical literature that has sought to measure these distances by comparing attitudes
of people, candidates and parties. This literature has studied whether people do indeed favor parties and
candidates whose distance is the lowest. See Markus and Converse (1979) for a classic treatment and Blais
el at. (2001) for a more recent e®ort.
7common probability density function F(c) with range [c;¹ c]. Third, and this is one of the key
assumptions discussed in the introduction, the payo® yix falls when individual x expects to
be more distant from the rest of the population.
Let N be the size of this population, pj be the ex ante probability that an individual
is of type j and Nj be the actual number of individuals of this type. If individuals' type
were observable, the Nj could be thought of as the number of draws of type j in a sample
of type N where each observation is drawn from a multinomial distribution with parameters
fp1;:::;pIg where I is the number of types. This way of thinking about the uncertainty
concerning Nj is useful below when people form expectations of the Nj on the basis of what
they actually observe, which are the vote totals for each candidate.






This distance measure is thus based on the same dij's that a®ect candidate preferences
and that have been estimated in the empirical literature on the spatial voting model. The
expectation of Di di®ers before and after the election. Let E0
ixDi denote the expectation
held before the election by person x of type i while E1
ixDi denotes this expectation after the
election. People's instantaneous utility presumably depends on their current perception of
Di. Even right before an election, however, individuals know that their lifetime utility is
much more a®ected by their perception of D after the election since more time will elapse
afterwards than before.
For simplicity, suppose that individuals of type i are concerned only with E1
ixDi so that
their utility from others' opinions is Si(E1
ixDi) with S0
i < 0 where S0
i is the derivative of
Si with respect to its argument. To simplify further, let the Si function be linear so that
Si = Si0 ¡ S0
iE1
ixDi where Si0 and S0
i are constants. The material payo® yix is then








where the cost c is incurred only if the individual votes. While this functional form appears
8like a reasonable ¯rst step for analyzing the impact of other people's opinions on a person's
well-being, it is important to stress that the available psychological evidence is not su±cient
to pin down the details of this dependence. It is possible, for example, that well-being
depends on the average rather than the total distance. This topic is discussed again brie°y
below.
An individual's vote has no e®ect on his own expectation of how many people of each
type there are, so its only possible e®ect on (2) is through the e®ect on die. On the other
hand, other peoples' votes do a®ect an individual's yix insofar as they a®ect the individual's
estimates of the number of people of types di®erent from his own. One complexity here
is that, because individuals know their own type and not that of others, they do not all
have the same estimate of the number of people of each type. Nonetheless, the shift of one
person from abstaining to voting for a particular candidate has the same e®ect on everyone
else's estimate of the Nj's. The reason is that everyone agrees on the probability that an
abstainer is of type j (where this probability is denoted by P(jjA)) and everyone agrees on
the probability that someone who votes for candidate k is of type j (where this probability
is denoted by P(jjk)). The shift by one person from abstaining to voting for k thus raises
all other people's expectation of Nj by [P(jjk) ¡ P(jjA)].
The probabilities P(jjk) and P(jjA) depend on two ingredients. The ¯rst is the uncon-
ditional probability that people are of type j. Under the assumption that the p's are known
parameters, this is pj. The second is the probability that people of type j vote for candidate
k, and I denote this probability by zk
j. The total probability that an individual of type j
votes is then zj =
P
k zk
j. These probabilities of voting need to be determined in equilibrium.
To derive the equilibrium conditions that these probabilities must satisfy, I study the e®ects
of voting on yi by taking these probabilities as exogenous.







In the simple case where people of type k only vote for candidate k and no other type votes
9for this candidate, zk
i is zero except when k = i so that P(kjk) = 1 and P(kjj) = P(jjk) = 0
for j 6= k. A vote for k is then fully informative about the type of the voter.




i pi(1 ¡ zi)
: (4)
If every type was equally likely to vote, all the zi's would be the same and this would reduce
to the ex ante probability pj.
Voting matters in this model because [P(jjk)¡P(jjA)] can be non-zero even though the
ex ante probability that a voter is of a given type is known by everyone. This is perhaps
most transparent when there are two types and two candidates, with all the voters of type
a voting for candidate a and all the voters of type b voting for candidate b. In this case,
P(aja) = P(bjb) = 1 and, if both types are equally likely to vote, P(ajA) = pa. Thus, the
probability that people assign to an individual being of type a moves from pa to 1 if this
individual moves from abstaining to voting for a. While individual votes are not observable,
vote totals are. Thus, an individual that stops abstaining and votes for a raises everyone's
expectation of Na by 1 ¡ pa.
The change in yix when someone other than individual x moves from abstaining to voting














These ±'s represent externalities from voting, and lead altruists to vote. The nature of this
externality can be understood from equations (3), (4) and (5). When people of a type j
that is distant from i tend not to vote for candidate k, their P(jjk) is low, and a vote for k
indicates that they are not of type j. As a result, people of type i experience an increase in
utility when there is an additional vote for this candidate. In addition, the more people of
type i vote (do not abstain), the larger is P(jjA) so that it is more likely that abstainers are
distant from i. This raises i's gain from a vote for k.
People are assumed to be more concerned with the welfare of those that they agree with.
Thus, the altruism of an individual of type i for an individual of type j is given by ¸ij, which
10is declining in dij. Consistent with the evidence in Andreoni (1989), I suppose that the
altruism in is of the \warm glow" variety so that individual x derives utility from his own
kind acts towards others while his utility does not depend on the pleasure that others derive











where the expectation E0
ix has a zero superscript to denote that it is based on information
available before the election, ^ yix is the material payo® of the people other than x that are
of type i, yj is the common material payo® of people of type j, and ¸ii is the altruism that
people of type i have for each other. Thus, the gain in utility for a person of type i when


















In this equation, ¢j(die) is the expected increase in the distance between type i and the type
of the elected representative e when one additional vote is cast for j, and E0
i is the expectation
held by all people of type i before voting (when they all have the same information set).
Since the voting probabilities zk
j are known in equilibrium, equations (3), (4), and (5) imply
that ±k





























The ¯rst equality is based on the fact that E0
i Nj equals (N ¡ 1)pj when i 6= j while E0
i Ni
equals 1 + pi(N ¡ 1) because people know their own type. The second equality is the result
of substituting equations (5) into the ¯rst equation of (8). Since (3) and (4) imply that the
8This assumption does not a®ect the analysis of voting nor the comparative statics results. It does,
however, reduce the bene¯ts that individuals receive when others agree with him.
11conditional probabilities P(mjk) and p(mjA) depend on the z's, the incentive to vote does
as well.
If people of type i vote, they vote for candidates whose uk
i is as large as possible. In
principle, there can be more than one such candidate, so it is useful to de¯ne the set Vi of
the preferred candidates of type i:







Any member of type i for whom uk
i is positive for the candidates k belonging to Vi wishes
to vote for one of these candidates. Thus, the fraction of people of type i that wish to vote
is the fraction for whom the cost of voting c is below the highest value of Gk
i + ¢k(die). In
equilibrium, all the people who wish to vote do so. Thus, an equilibrium is a set of zm
j 's for








k(die) if k 2 Vi (9)
In this de¯nition, the c¤
i's are the cuto® levels of voting cost such that people vote when
their costs are below this and abstain when their costs exceed this. If c¤
i < c, the bene¯t of
voting is less than the smallest cost of voting and no person of type i votes. I show below
that this can occur for some types in equilibrium. It is easy to see, however, that there
cannot be an equilibrium without votes under the weak and standard assumptions that the
bene¯ts of having an elected o±cial of one's own type exceeds the minimum voting costs c.
In much of the analysis, I let F be invertible, and thus strictly increasing. The cuto® cost
levels c¤
i are then equal to F ¡1(zi). In this case, any increase in type i's bene¯ts of voting
Gk
i + ¢k(die), lead to an increase in the turnout zi. It sometimes simpli¯es the analysis,
however, to suppose that some types ¯nd themselves in equilibrium at cuto® cost levels c¤
i
that don't correspond to any individual's level of voting cost. This can occur when F has a
°at area so that no one has costs between c1 and c2, and one of these is below the equilibrium
c¤
i while the other is above. In this case, small changes in Gk
i +¢k(die) do not a®ect type i's
equilibrium turnout.
123 Two-Candidate Equilibria
This section considers the standard case where people can be of two types and there are
two candidates. Subsection 3.1 concentrates on equilibria where, as in spatial voting models,
each type votes for its favorite candidate. Subsection 3.2 then considers equilibria where
they do not, and shows that these often exist but are less robust to plausible modi¯cations
of the model.
3.1 Equilibrium where people vote for their favorite candidate
Let the two types and candidates be denoted by a and b and, while pa need not equal pb,
these types are symmetric with S0
a = S0
b = S0, dab = dba = d, and ¸aa = ¸bb = ¸0. Suppose
¯rst that the two types feel neither altruism nor spite for one another so that ¸ab = ¸ba = 0.
The vicarious bene¯t of voting Gk
i is particularly easy to compute in this case because the
double summation in (8) reduces to one term.
For type a, the vicarious bene¯t of voting equals (N ¡ 1)¸0S0d[P(bjA) ¡ P(bjk)]. This
says that the larger is the di®erence between the probability that an abstainer supports b
and the probability that a person voting for k supports b, the more useful is voting for k as
a signal that indicates that there are fewer supporters of b. Since people of type a prefer to
have an elective representative of type a, a su±cient condition for them to vote for a is that
Ga
a exceed Gb





















This shows that people of type a are more attracted to candidate a, the more other people
of type a vote for a and the more people of type b vote for b. Since the same analysis applies
to type b, there is positive feedback in that increases in the fraction of people of type i that
vote for candidate i lead people of type i to be more inclined to vote for i. This logic implies
that mixed strategy equilibria tend to be unstable. It also implies that there always exists a
pure strategy equilibrium where, consistent with spatial theories of voting, people vote for
their favorite candidate and zb
a = za
b = 0.
13I now analyze this equilibrium. Since a vote for a indicates one is not of type b and
viceversa, P(ajb) = P(bja) = 0. Thus, the equilibrium conditions in (9) when F is invertible
become






pa(1 ¡ za) + pb(1 ¡ zb)
(11)






pa(1 ¡ za) + pb(1 ¡ zb)
; (12)
where the second equality for each equation is obtained using (4). Ignoring the e®ects on
the election outcome ¢, this has the symmetric solution
F
¡1(zi) = (N ¡ 1)¸0S
0dpa(1 ¡ pa) i = a;b: (13)
While this equation cannot be expected to hold exactly if the ¢'s are nonzero, it should
provide a good approximation for the large turnout rates that are observed. It has the
remarkable implication that both types turn out with the same probability and that this
probability rises with the tightness of the election (with pa(1 ¡ pa) reaching a maximum
when pa = :5). The intuition for this result is that an increase in pa has two opposing e®ects
on the extent to which a supporter of ra ¯nds it attractive to vote. On the one hand, it raises
the expected number of people that gain from hearing that there is one more person of type
a. On the other hand, an increase in pa also implies that the \good news" component of
such a vote is reduced, since it leads abstainers to become more likely to support ra as well.
Indeed, when turnout rates are the same for both groups, this \good news" component is
proportional to 1¡pa so that the vicarious bene¯t from voting is proportional to pa(1¡pa).
The same logic applies to b since pa = 1 ¡ pb.
Equation (13) can also be used to obtain estimates of the bene¯ts of voting at a symmetric
equilibrium. These are given by the right hand side of this equation. Suppose that ¸0 is
equal to .05 so that each individual puts .05 as much weight on the utility of like-minded
people as he does on his own. Suppose also that S0d equals .001 of a penny so that an
individual gains a penny when he discovers that another 1000 people agree with him and
that, analogously to the US case, N equals 150 million. This corresponds to an individual
14gaining $15 when he learns that an additional 1% of the population agrees with him. In a
tight election with pa = :5, the right hand side of (13) is then equal to $18.75. This implies
that all those for whom ci is lower than $18.75 should vote in national elections. Turnout
should thus be substantial if, as argued by Blais (2000 p. 84-87), voting costs are fairly
modest.9
For variations in the closeness of elections of the magnitude observed in advanced democ-
racies, (13) implies that changes in pa should have small e®ects in turnout rates. If pa = :55,
the odds facing candidate b become vanishingly small even with quite small turnout rates.
Still, keeping the previous parameters, all individuals whose costs of voting is lower than
$18.56 should still vote. The exact fall in turnout thus depends on the fraction of people
with voting costs between $18.56 and $18.75. Still, the predicted falls in turnout are prob-
ably not dramatic for plausible choices of the pdf F. This ¯ts with the conclusion of Blais
(2000, p. 137-8) that \a gap of ten points between the leading and the second parties seems
to reduce electoral participation by only one point."
Equation (13) implies that turnout should be increasing in the number of eligible voters
N. For a given S0, that is for a given increase in the utility of voters when there is one
additional person that agrees with them, a larger N implies that more people bene¯t from
this additional vote so that voters derive more vicarious utility from voting. This result
hinges crucially on the supposition that people care about the total distance D as opposed
to caring about other functions of the d's. If, for example, people cared about the average
distance between themselves and other voters, the analysis above would remain valid but S0
would be proportional to 1=(N ¡ 1).10 Predicted turnout rates would then be independent
9It might be imagined that rounding would destroy this result. This is not the case when the size of
rounding errors is unpredictable before the election and unknown thereafter. Suppose, in particular that
votes are rounded to the nearest 100 (or that voters ignore the last two digits in the reported results) but
that voters expect the last two digits of the actual number of votes to be uniformly distributed between 00
and 99. By voting for a candidate they thus have a 1/100 chance of raising the last two digits from 49 to 50
and thus increasing by 100 other people's expectation regarding this candidates' vote total. Their expected
bene¯t from one vote is thus 1/100 times the expected bene¯t from 100 votes. For linear S, this is equal to
the bene¯ts calculated in the text.
10It might be thought that if people cared about the average distance, elections would not contain any
useful information given that people are assumed to already know the probabilities associated with all the
15of N. Thus, as discussed above, the model's implications regarding the e®ect of changes in
the population depend on aspects of preferences about which more information is needed.
The analysis has treated each voter as caring equally for all members of the population
that sher the voter's opinion. This raises the substantive question of whether it would not
be more accurate to treat people as caring only about those individuals who are relatively
closely connected to them. One version of this idea would imply that people care almost
exclusively about the messages that they send to the inhabitants of their town, district or
state rather than about the messages that they broadcast to the whole country. If this
were the case, turnout in national elections should be no larger than than turnout in local
elections. If, instead, people cared for the welfare and opinions of non-local voters and also
cared somewhat about the size of the audience for their votes, turnout should be larger in
national elections. In fact, Blais (2000, p. 40) shows that, indeed, turnout in (sub-national)
legislative elections is generally lower than in presidential ones.
By the same token, concern with non-local voters implies that the closeness of the election
that determines turnout is the closeness at the national level. This should be true even if, as
in the U.S. presidential election, a national o±cial is elected indirectly with voters choosing
state-wide representatives to the electoral college. The closeness at the state level, which
determines the members of the electoral college, should be less important. Consistent with
this, Foster's (1984) shows a negligible cross-sectional correlation between a state's turnout
and the closeness of the U.S. presidential election at the state level.11 Moreover, Blais
(2000, p. 76) shows that a person's stated intention to vote in the 1996 British Columbia
types. The reason this is not the case, is that people do not know the sample realization of the mean distance.
It is true that the law of large numbers leads the mean distance from the sample that is realized by voting to
converge to the expected distance based on the ex ante probabilities. However, when this mean is multiplied
by the number of people that care about it, a single vote matters. Some intuition for this result may be
obtained by recalling that the mean multiplied by the square root of the sample size has a non-degenerate
distribution.
11Unfortunately, a time series analysis of national turnout in these elections is made di±cult by the paucity
of observations and the presence of low frequency movements in turnout. As a suggestive anecdote, it is worth
mentioning that the total number of voters in Massachusetts and New York rose by 12% and 9% respectively
from the presidential election of 1996 to the much closer presidential election of 2004. This occurred even
though the populations in these two states were stagnant and even though the electoral college results in all
four of these elections were a foregone conclusion at the time.
16parliamentary election was more tightly correlated with the person's perceived closeness of
the election at the provincial level than with her perceived closeness at the level of the
constituency.
So far, I have let people of each type be altruistic only towards other people of their
own type, and have supposed that they are neutral - neither altruistic nor spiteful - towards
people of the other type. Attitudes towards people that have di®erent views than one's own
can vary a great deal however. Moreover, one implication of the model that is not shared by
alternatives is that these attitudes have an important e®ect on turnout. At a general level,
this is evident from the de¯nition of Gk
i in (8), which shows that the vicarious bene¯ts of
voting depend on the altruism of i for all other types.
Suppose now that altruism for people of a di®erent type is nonzero so that ¸ab = ¸ba = ¸1.
Then, continuing to focus on the equilibrium where people of type i vote for candidate i and
using (3),(4) in (8), we have
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This shows that animus towards people who support the other candidate (i.e. a negative
¸1) increases the vicarious bene¯ts of voting, and thus increases turnout as a result of (9). If
people that one dislikes are made unhappy by hearing that more people disagree with them,
one can increase one's own utility by signaling one's disagreement with them.
Conversely, altruism towards people of the other type, (i.e. a positive ¸1) reduces turnout.
Similarly, reductions in the perceived distance d across the types reduce Ga
a and Gb
b (even if
¸1 = 0) so that they reduce turnout as well. This serves to con¯rm that this theory of turnout
and voting is based on the two psychological assumptions that I stated in the introduction.
People must dislike it if other voters disagree with them and they must have more altruism
17for those that agree with them. The weakening of either force reduces turnout. Because
neither d nor ¸ij have been subject to extensive measurement, it is di±cult to know at this
stage whether these variables explain di®erences in turnout rates in di®erent locations or at
di®erent times.
The equilibrium in (9) is based on the standard assumption that voting costs vary in the
population, so that those whose costs are relatively high end up abstaining. This model also
allows the resulting equilibria to be interpreted somewhat di®erently, however. Equation (8)
implies that a type a individual votes if
c · (N ¡ 1)S
0¸0dpa
(1 ¡ pa)(1 ¡ zb)
pa(1 ¡ za) + (1 ¡ pa)(1 ¡ zb)
¡ ¢
a(dae):
In equilibrium, the fraction of people that satisfy this inequality must be equal to za, and
I have induced this probabilistic voting through the standard assumption that c random
across the population. It can equally well be induced by letting everyone have the same cost
of voting and supposing that people di®er in their altruism. There is then a cuto® value
of ¸0 that leaves people indi®erent between voting and not voting and equilibrium requires
that a fraction za of people of type a have altruism levels larger than this cuto® value.
This alternative has a desirable feature. This is that individuals with large values of
¸aa do not just want to vote, they are also willing to spend resources on activities whose
e®ectiveness at increasing the utility of those that agree with them is more modest. These
activities could include, for example, wearing political buttons or putting signs on their
lawns that provide further support for individuals that share their beliefs. This ¯ts with the
¯nding of Copeland and Laband (2002) that people who carry out such activities are more
likely to vote.12 As I discuss in the conclusion, a variant of this model where people vary in
their altruism may also provide an explanation for why people feel social pressure to vote.
12This raises the general question of how this model relates to the \expressive voter" model that Copeland
and Laband (2002) see as being supported by their evidence. The model of this paper shares with expressive
voter models such as Brennan and Buchanan (1984) the idea that voters vote to express an opinion (rather
than to a®ect the election outcome). Where the current model di®ers is in supposing that this desire to
express oneself is the result of seeking to help others, as opposed to being directly useful to the self. This is
the source of the comparative statics implied by the model.
183.2 Eliminating multiple equilibria
The equilibrium in subsection 3.1 involves a turnout that is so large that people can people
can neglect their in°uence on the voting outcome. This means that, if turnout rates were
equally large but (10) were violated so that Gb
a was somewhat larger than Ga
a and Ga
b was
somewhat larger than Gb
b, each type would prefer to vote for the candidate that they like
least. In e®ect, the signaling value of these \wrong" votes would outweigh the negligible
e®ect of individual votes on the election's outcome. In this subsection, I demonstrate that
there generally does exist an equilibrium of this type. I also argue that this equilibrium is
not as robust as the one considered in subsection 3.1.
At an equilibrium of this sort, everyone expects people of type a to vote for b and
viceversa, so that P(aja) = P(bjb) = 0. Using (8), type a's vicarious bene¯t from voting for
the \wrong" candidate Gb
a, is equal to (N ¡1)S0dpaP(bjA), which is identical to a's vicarious
value of voting for a in the previous section. By the same token, type b's vicarious bene¯t
from voting for a equals (N ¡ 1)S0dpbP(ajA).
Thus (9) implies that the equilibrium turnout rate for a is given by (11) once again,
with ¢a(dae) replaced by ¢b(dae) while that for b is given by (12) with ¢b(dbe) replaced by
¢a(dbe). As long as ¸0, and S0d are as large as before, the resulting equilibrium turnout
rates are large enough that the di®erences between these ¢'s are negligible. The equilibrium




Nonetheless, equilibria where people all vote for the candidate they dislike are unattrac-
tive. They probably arise in this model because it neglects two important real-world phe-
nomena. The ¯rst is the process by which candidates get selected, which usually requires
that like-minded people make a consistent e®ort in favor of a candidate. The second is the
opportunity that at least some people have to credibly communicate their voting intentions.
A modi¯cation of the model that incorporates elements of these two phenomena does not
have these these unappealing equilibria. The basic idea is to solve the voters' coordination
problem by following Farrell and Saloner (1985). To do this, let a group of ni individuals of
19type i have publicly observable votes. These individuals vote in sequence and do so before
other people vote. Under some additional assumptions, these ni individuals are guaranteed
to vote for i and the unique equilibrium has all supporters of ri vote for i. In particular
Proposition 1. Suppose that people neglect the information about Ni contained in ni while
ni exceeds half the expected votes for candidate i, so that it exceeds piz¤
iN=2.13 Then, even if
individuals neglect their in°uence on voting outcomes, the unique equilibrium has people of
type i voting only for i.
Proof: If people neglect the information about Ni contained in ni, (9) determines equilibrium
turnout. Because ni > piz¤
i N=2, it follows that (10) holds when all ni vote for candidate i
even if all other supporters of ri are expected to vote for the other candidate. Thus, if all
members of ni vote for i, every other person of type i that votes does so as well. Similarly,
if all members of ni vote for the candidate who does not favor ri, all other supporters of ri
do so also.
If all members of na and of nb were to support the same candidate k, this candidate would
win the election. To see this, note ¯rst that k would be getting more than half of the votes
that would have been forthcoming if each type voted for its own candidate. This election
advantage is only strengthened if, for either i, the supporters of ri that are not members of
ni were to vote for k as well. If the supporters of ra and rb that are not in na or nb were
to vote for the other candidate instead, both candidates would receive votes of both types.
For given turnout rates, P(ijA) ¡ P(ijm) would be lower for each i and m equal to either
a or b than it would be if i were known not to vote for candidate k. The vicarious bene¯ts
of voting, and overall turnout, would thus be lower. Therefore, the votes by na and nb for k
would be decisive once again.
13It cannot be literally true that ni contains no information about Ni since we must have Ni ¸ ni.
However, this information can be mostly irrelevant in equilibrium. Suppose, for example that there are ¯xed
numbers n¤
i determined in advance and that a person's cost of voting and types are determined in sequence
(with each person having a probability pi of being of type i). Then, suppose that ni is the minimum of
n¤
i and the number of people who would vote for i in an equilibrium where no vote is observed. Then, ni
conveys information that could a®ect equilibrium beliefs about about Ni only when ni < n¤
i, and this occurs
quite seldom when n¤
i is substantially below piN.
20Suppose without loss of generality that the majority prefers ra. The na supporters of ra
then want to vote for a to ensure that the elected o±cial has their own tastes. It is thus
a dominant strategy for the last member of na to vote for a if all previous members did
so. Reasoning by backwards induction, voting for a is also a dominant strategy for previous
members of na since they know that subsequent members will follow by voting for a.
Given that the na have a dominant strategy, the nb individuals of type b expect that a
will win the election whether they vote for a or for b. If they vote for b, all other supporters
of rb will do so as well. The result is a larger value of P(ajA) ¡ P(ajb) than the value of
either P(ajA) ¡ P(aja) or P(ajA) ¡ P(ajb) that results from having the nb individuals vote
for a. By voting for b, therefore, the nb supporters of rb raise the \warm glow" utility of
rb supporters. This means, again, that it is a dominant strategy for the last member of nb
to vote for b if all previous members have done so. Similarly, it is a dominant strategy for
earlier members of nb to vote for b as well.
4 Three-way contests
As discussed in the introduction, Lacy and Burden's (1999) evidence suggests that third
party candidates are capable of simultaneously raising turnout and taking votes from major
candidates. To be faithful to these observations, one needs a model with at least four
di®erent types of people. Such a model allows two types to be loyal voters for the two major
candidates while one type can switch its votes from a major candidate to the third-party
candidate when this became possible. The last type can then ¯ll the role of voting for the
third-party candidate while abstaining in a two-way race. An example with four types having
these features is discussed in subsection 4.2. Before presenting this example, it is useful to
consider in somewhat more generality a situation with three types, two of whom are popular.
This is the subject of subsection 4.1.
Even with three types, the basic issues that arise with three candidates can be studied. If
the third type votes for the third candidate in a three-way election but would have voted for
a major candidate in a two-way election, one can say that the third candidate \stole" some
21votes from a major one. If, instead, the third type continues to vote for the major party
candidate in a three-way race that includes a candidate of his own type, we have a version of
\strategic voting," in that people are not voting for their favorite candidate and are voting
instead for a more popular one. Lastly, if the third type does not vote in a two-way election
but does vote when his favorite candidate is present, we have the \turnout e®ect" discussed
by Lacy and Burden (1999).
The advantage of focusing on three types is that the conditions on the parameters that
give rise to these phenomena are more transparent. There are, on the other hand, two
advantages of the example with four types considered in subsection 4.2. The ¯rst is that the
minor candidate is then able to attract some votes even when \strategic voting" leads some
of his supporters to vote for a more electable candidate. The second is that the presence
of four types allows one to demonstrate a new source of positive feedback in the support of
third party candidates. The more votes these candidates attract, the less a vote for them
is construed as a vote against mainstream views, and this increases the third party's vote
total. This bandwagon e®ect implies that the presence of minor candidates can make election
outcomes more unpredictable.
4.1 Three types
In this subsection, types a and b vote for their favorite candidates and there is a new type,
labeled g, whose membership is small so that pg is substantially smaller than either pa or pb.
Without loss of generality, I treat g as being closer to a than to b. More speci¯cally, type
g has the same relationship with b than does type a, so the distance between b and g is d
and the altruism parameter ¸bg is set to zero like ¸ab. The distance between a and g, on the
other hand, is denoted by ^ d and is supposed to be no larger than d. The altruism these two
types have for each other is denoted by ^ ¸, and this is no greater than ¸0, the altruism that
people have for members of their own type. Lastly, the extent to which type g cares about
changes in D, S0
g, is allowed to be potentially di®erent from S0
a = S0
b = S0. This turns out to
be critical for the viability of minor party candidates.
22The focus of this section is on the votes of members of type g. Still, it is worth starting by
analyzing brie°y how types a and b respond to the introduction of type g and to the actions
of the members of this type. Using (9), the equilibrium turnout rate type b individuals obeys
F
¡1(zb) + ¢





= (N ¡ 1)¸0pbS
0d(1 ¡ P(bjA));
where the second equality follows from the fact that abstainers must be of types a, b, or g.
This equation is identical to (12) in the case where there are only two types because, in this
case, P(ajA) = 1¡P(bjA). Thus, the behavior of type b individuals is a®ected by additional
types only insofar these change the extent to which an abstention indicates that one is of
type b.
Because people of type a care for people of type g and because people of type g may vote
for a, the e®ect on za is more complex. Using (9), za solves


















If people who support rg switch their votes from g to a, they raise P(gja) while lowering
P(aja) correspondingly. The net e®ect of such a change is to reduce the right hand side of
this equation if ¸0paS0 > ^ ¸pgS0
g. This e®ect comes about because increases in type g's vote
for a dilute the extent to which such a vote signals that one is of type a and this can reduce
type a's bene¯t from voting. In other words, a candidate's support by a \special interest"
(g) can erode his support by people that agree with him. This implies that it is conceivable
that a candidate could increase his vote total by preventing a special interest from voting
for him. A countervailing force is that, in this model, this e®ect is large only when pg is
su±ciently large that P(gja) is a®ected signi¯cantly by the change in g's votes. When pg is
large, however, the votes of people of type g can help candidates win the election.
In the case where pg is small, the e®ect of changes in g's votes on the right hand side
of this equation is smaller. To simplify the analysis of this section, I henceforth neglect the
e®ect of g's actions on za and zb. As discussed above, this neglect would be justi¯ed for small
23pg if the F function had °at areas near the turnout rates that constitute an equilibrium for
a and b when g does not vote. More generally, this can be regarded as an approximation
that is increasingly valid as pg is reduced.
Focusing now on people of type g, (8) implies that their utility gain from voting for


































Ignoring any e®ects on the outcome of the election, this means that g prefers voting for


























Proposition 2. People of type g ¯nd that, even if they neglect their e®ect on the election
outcome, voting for b is strictly dominated by voting for a if pg is su±ciently small.
Proof: Because types a and b vote for their favorite candidates, P(ajb) = P(bja) = 0. Using


















For pg su±ciently small, P(aja) and P(bjb) are arbitrarily close to one so the left hand side
of this equation is nonnegative. A small pg also implies that P(gja) is smaller than P(bjb)
so that the right hand side is negative and the inequality holds.
This proposition implies that g votes for either a or g (when the latter is available). One
interesting aspect of this result is that people of type g vote for the candidate that is closer
to them even if they do not take into account their probability of changing the election
24Table 1: Preference parameters and Third-party voting patterns
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g > 0 \Turnout e®ect" \Vote stealing"
outcome. It also implies that the parameters can be decomposed into four quadrants, as in
Table 1.
I start by studying conditions under which one ¯nds oneself in the left column of Table 1
so that type g does not vote for a in two-candidate contests. For this to be an equilibrium,
ua
g must be negative when za
g is zero. When za
g is zero, P(gja) is zero as well so that, using
















As long as one neglects the e®ect on the election outcome ¢, this is satis¯ed for any positive
c in the limit where g is independent of a so that ^ d = d and ^ ¸ = 0. The reason is that,
in this case, the expression in curly brackets is negative because pa + pb < 1. On the other
hand, reductions of ^ d and increases in ^ ¸ raise this expression and can eliminate equilibria
where g does not vote for a in a two candidate race.
Because the conditional probabilities in (16) change when za
g rises, equilibria where people
of type g vote for a may exist even if (18) is satis¯ed. A su±cient condition for this not to
be the case is provided by the following
Proposition 3. Suppose that g is independent of a, za = zb = ¹ z and the the costs of voting
become prohibitively large for type g when zg is equal to ¹ z. There then exists no equilibrium
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25This is increasing in zg. Thus, Ga
g reaches its highest value when zg equals ¹ z, the value of
za and zb. Some algebra implies that this is then equal to the expression in square brackets
in (19). Condition (19) thus ensures that even the person with the lowest costs of voting is
unwilling to vote for a under the conditions that make this as attractive as possible.
Notice that, because pg is small, condition (19) is easy to satisfy even if (13) implies that
supporters of a and b are willing to incur fairly substantial costs of voting for their own
candidates. The reason is simple: for a member of type g, voting for a is not nearly as good
a signal of agreement with other people of type g.
This brings us to the conditions under which one ¯nds oneself in the second row of Table
1 so that people of type g vote for candidate g in a three-way race. This requires both that
voting for g be superior to voting for a and that voting for g be better than abstaining. Since
P(ajg) = 0, (17) implies that the former is satis¯ed if
[¸0pgS
0
g ¡ ^ ¸paS][1 ¡ P(gja)] > 0: (20)
Equilibria where all members of type g abstain exist only if ug
g is negative when evaluated
at zg
g = 0. At this point, P(gjg) = 1 so that (16) implies people would deviate from such an
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If conditions (20) and (21) are satis¯ed, people of type g vote for g in three-candidate
races. It is now apparent that these conditions do not bear a strong relationship to conditions
(18) and (19) under which people of type g fail to vote for a in two-candidate races. The
latter require that people of type g fail to care for people of type a while (20) and (21) are
satis¯ed as long as S0
g is relatively large so that people of this type derive a lot of utility from
learning that others share their views. One can thus ¯nd parameters for all four quadrants
of Table 1.
One question that remains, though, is whether S0
g has to be unreasonably large to justify
voting for small parties whose pg is correspondingly low. An estimate of the S0
g that is needed
26can be obtained from (21). Ignoring ¢g, and taking the case where ^ d = d, this condition
requires the minimum cost of voting to be no larger than (N ¡1)¸0pg(1¡P(gjA))S0
gd, which
is approximately (N ¡1)¸0pgS0
gd for small pg. In a population of 150 million, a person with
an altruism ¸0 equal to .05 and an $5 cost of voting would be willing to vote for a party
whose pg is .001 (so that it has an expected 150,000 supporters) if his S0
gd were .00067.
This would require that supporters of g gain $1.00 if they heard that g had an additional 1
percent (i.e. 1500) supporters. While this requires that members of fringe political groups
derive nontrivial gains from learning that others agree with them, the size of these gains
does not seem implausibly large.
One ¯nal implication of the analysis that is worth highlighting is the e®ect of pa, the
popularity of a, on the likelihood that people of type g vote for a in three-way elections.
Inequality (20) demonstrates that, for ¯xed S0
g and positive ^ ¸, a higher pa makes it more
likely that these individuals vote for a. The reason is that people of type g care somewhat
for each person of type a so they are more inclined to send a signal that people of type a
would like to hear if they expect these supporters to be more numerous.
This ¯ts at least broadly with results in the empirical literature on strategic voting.
Abramson et al. (1992), for example, run a regression explaining the likelihood that individ-
uals plan to vote for their preferred candidate and show that this is increasing in the extent
to which respondents perceive this candidate to have a chance to win. Naturally, candidates
have a higher chance to win if their support is higher so this is tantamount to saying that
type g respondents are more likely to vote for a the higher is pa relative to pg.
4.2 A simple example with four types
One somewhat special consequence of allowing for only three types is that a three candidate
race allows each type to vote for a candidate that fully shares its views. When the number
of minor candidates is smaller than the number of small groups that disagree with a and b,
some people can face a more di±cult choice. To underline this di±culty, this section shows
that the behavior of a group without its own candidate can be unstable when this group
27cares about more than one type. As more of them vote for one candidate, they ¯nd voting
for this candidate more desirable.14
To show this I consider a stripped down setup with an additional type h that is committed
to candidate h. Types a and b continue to have their own candidates, while people of type
g no longer have a candidate of their own. People of type g are assumed to feel close to
both a and h though these two groups do not have much a±nity for each other. The key
insight is that, as more members of type g vote for h, their gain from voting for h rises. The
reason is that people of type a regard a vote for h as a less bad signal the more people of
type g vote for h. Similarly, people of type h regard a vote for a as a worse signal the more
people of type g vote for h. Both these changes make voting for h more desirable for people
of type g. In other words, the reason a group can end up voting for either the mainstream or
the fringe candidate is that the more this type votes for the fringe candidate, the less badly
these votes are seen by the mainstream, and the worse mainstream votes are seen by people
who are committed to the fringe candidate.
I capture these e®ects by making extreme assumptions regarding ¸ and d, though the
forces discussed here remain relevant in more complex settings. I suppose, in particular,
that types a, b and h all see each other as being separated by a distance d and have neither
altruism nor spite for one another. By contrast, dag = dgh = 0 and ¸ag = ¸gh = ¸0. While
extreme, this setup where a and h both see themselves as identical to g while a and h see
themselves as being far from each other is particularly simple to analyze. It implies that a
person of type g derives the same utility when someone else votes for a than when someone
else votes for h. As a result, (8) implies that the di®erence between type g's vicarious bene¯t
14This instability is reminiscent of Bartels (1987), where people support their favorite candidate only if
they think this candidate will receive substantial votes from others. It might be imagined that this problem
can arise also when there are three types and two candidates, so that the type without candidate can end up
supporting either. When the type without candidate has a relative small membership, however, Proposition
2 implies that this is not possible. The reason is that, in this case, the bene¯t that members of a small group
have from joining other members who happen to be voting for the \wrong" candidate are swamped by the
bene¯t of signaling their allegiance to the large group that they prefer.





















where the equality follows from (3). Within the expressions in square brackets, the ¯rst
terms relate to the losses to people of type h as a result of a vote for a while the second
terms relate to the losses to people of type a as a result of a vote for h. Equation (22) is
rising in zh
g and falling in za
g. There are thus parameters such that the equation is negative
when g only votes for a, which rationalizes voting for a, and positive if g only votes for h,
which rationalizes voting for h. Note that such parameters exist even if pg is small because
the last term in (22) is quite sensitive to zh
g even for small pg as long as ph is small as well.
5 Conclusion
The model of voting in this paper is both derived from assumptions about human psychology
that have some empirical support and predicts patterns of voting that ¯t with some existing
empirical evidence. It is important to stress, however, that the model's assumptions and
predictions could both be subject to much sharper tests than those that have already been
carried out in the literature. Indeed, one of the principal strengths of the model is that seems
to be possible to check not only its qualitative predictions but also some of its quantitative
ones.
In this conclusion, I discuss two additional areas that deserve further work. The ¯rst
concerns the modeling of the information available to voters. Consistent with most of the
formal voting literature, I have assumed that people know the probability that any one
person will favor a particular candidate. Given the realistically large turnout rates implied
by the model, the agents in the model cannot be left in doubt about the outcome of the
election. This is to some extent a strength of this modeling assumption. Particularly in
the case of the minor party candidates that I have discussed at length, the electoral failure
of many candidates is a foregone conclusion. On the other hand, people are undoubtedly
uncertain about the outcome of many elections and it would be attractive to have a model
29that included this uncertainty while also having large turnout rates.
It should be possible to incorporate this uncertainty into the current model, particularly
because this uncertainty seems compatible with the Bayesian approach that the agents in
the model use to compute their expected distance from the rest of the population. This
uncertainty could even raise slightly people's incentive to vote if they felt that, by voting,
they were able to a®ect other people's perception of the proportion of abstainers that favor
their own position. This e®ect may well be small, however, and uncertainty also complicates
the analysis in other ways. For example, this uncertainty implies that there is a positive
correlation between the success of a candidate and the extent to which people who abstain
are expected to support this candidate. This can create a correlation between the number of
people who react favorably to a vote and the information content of a vote. Still, the main
e®ect discussed here should be preserved. Whether there is uncertainty ex ante about the
support of a candidate or not, there is always uncertainty ex post about where abstainers
stand. The model in this paper relies just on this ex post uncertainty. The reason people vote
in the model is to resolve some of this ex post uncertainty in the direction that is attractive
to those who agree with them.
A di®erent direction in which it would be worthwhile to extend the model is to incor-
porate people's dislike for those that they regard as insu±ciently altruistic. As discussed
in Rotemberg (2008), spite against people who appear insu±ciently altruistic can explain
numerous ¯eld and experimental observations in which people spend resources to punish
ungenerous behavior. In the context of voting, this may explain the evidence of Knack
(1992) and Gerber et al. (2008) that some people vote because they fear that others would
disapprove if they didn't. As discussed earlier, the current model can be interpreted as
one where people vary in their altruism, and the more altruistic people vote.15 This means
that, if people disapprove of those who are not altruistic towards anyone, they disapprove of
non-voters. A model incorporating this disapproval should have higher turnout. Its voters
15Knack (1992) provides some evidence for this because he shows that people who give more to charity
are more likely to vote.
30would not be con¯ned to those who are actually altruistic, but would also include those that
pretend to be.
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